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      Foreword 
 
This note was written and submitted for publication in March of 2014. 
The patent landscape has been dynamic (more like terrifying) since that 
time. In particular, the Supreme Court has issued landmark opinions 
changing the exceptional case standard under Section 285 (Octane Fitness) 
and changing the scope of the test for patentable subject matter under 
Section 101 (Alice).  Consequently, this note has been selectively updated 




Consider the following brief fact scenarios. First, a small-time 
inventor has a brilliant idea and the good sense to patent it, but cannot 
afford to start a business, so instead licenses the patent to a company who 
then uses the technology with great success.  Second, a university conducts 
research that is ultimately patented, but licenses the technology to a 
company in order to keep focused on research.  Both of the aforementioned 
scenarios seem to have positive outcomes, right?  But what if it took a 
lawsuit, by either the small-time inventor or the university, rather than a 
bargain, to compel the license? “WHO CARES,” says the mob, they are 
both patent trolls!  Unfortunately, widespread concern with enforcing 
patent rights without practicing those rights has resulted into a bewildering 
range of “anti-troll” activism. 
But first, what is a “patent troll?” Wikipedia defines a “patent troll” as 
“a person or company who enforces patent rights against accused infringers in 
an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not manufacture products or supply 
services based upon the patents in question, thus engaging in economic rent-
seeking.”1  Though patent trolls have certainly been labeled much worse 
things,2 this “definition” is still bloated with tacit disapproval.  For example, 
“accused infringers” only slightly obfuscates the implication that the accused 
infringers are not actual infringers.  And the not-so-subtle condemnation for “not 
manufactur[ing] products or supply[ing] services based upon the patents in 
question” seems to imply that patents are meant only for those patentees that 
intend to manufacture and supply—despite the fact that patents provide no 
explicit or implicit right to actually do either.3  Finally, “rent-seeking”—
though somewhat out of context4—essentially implies that patent trolls create 
 
 1.  Patent troll, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll (last visited Apr. 2, 
2014) (emphasis added). 
 2.  See, e.g., Kevin O’Connor, How to Slaughter a Patent Troll in 5 Steps, PANDODAILY 
(July. 26, 2013), http://pando.com/2013/07/26/how-to-slaughter-a-patent-troll-in-5-steps/ (labeling 
patent trolls as the “scum of the earth”). 
 3.  See General Information Concerning Patents, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp#heading-1 (last 
updated Apr. 4, 2012). 
 4.  See, e.g., David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (using the term 
“rent seeking” in a political context).  
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wealth for themselves without creating wealth for anyone else, but ignores the 
fact that in all likelihood the troll had to buy the patent from someone else (or the 
right to assert it), thereby creating wealth for someone else. 
At times, “patent trolls” are referred to by more civilized acronyms. 
For example, the term “non-practicing entity” or “NPE” has been said to 
apply generally to entities that do not actually practice the patents they 
own.5  As another example, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) coined 
the term “patent assertion entity” or “PAE” to identify a narrower class of 
NPEs with a business model that “focuses on purchasing and asserting 
patents against manufacturers already using the technology, rather than 
developing and transferring technology.”6  According to the FTC, “the term 
NPE encompasses patent owners that primarily seek to develop and 
transfer technology, such as universities and semiconductor designs.  
Patent assertion entities do not include this latter group.”7  Some believe 
the term “patent monetization entities” (“PMEs”) better articulates the 
distinction between “all such efforts to monetize patent rights” and the 
“behavior involved in creating products and services based on the 
innovation covered by the patent.”8 This camp, however, excludes 
universities from the definition of PMEs under the premise that 
universities’ core activities are education and academic research, not 
monetization.9  In the following discussion, “patent troll” will be defined as 
an entity that owns a patent (or at least the rights to assert it) and who does 
not practice the patent or intend to practice the patent, but, instead intends 
merely to monetize the patent through litigations or threats of the same. 
One would be hard-pressed to find a branch of the government (state 
or federal), journalist, reporter, pundit, critic, or other advocate that is not 
voicing an opinion.  For example, President Obama said that patent trolls 
“hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of 
them.”10 Outspoken business owners have been similarly critical. For example, 
Mark Cuban proclaimed that “[d]umbass patents are crushing small 
businesses.”11 Even the judges adjudicating the “trolling” are weighing in 
conspicuously, and not just through their normal mediums of written orders and 
judgments.  For example, a New York Times article co-written by Chief Judge 
 
 5.  Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 366 (2012). 
 6.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011). 
 7.  Id. at n.5 (emphasis added). 
 8.  Jeruss, supra note 5, at 368. 
 9.  Id. at 370. 
 10.  President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-
union-address. 
 11.  Id. 
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of the Federal Circuit, Randall Rader, stated that “[t]he onslaught of litigation 
brought by ‘patent trolls’—who typically buy up a slew of patents, then sue 
anyone and everyone who might be using or selling the claimed inventions—has 
slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and 
consumers, and clogged our judicial system.”12 When otherwise circumspect 
members of the judiciary start penning op-eds for major news outlets rather than 
classical reporters, you know that the issue has hit a boiling point. 
The level of attention garnered by patent trolls is not without objective 
basis.  For example, it has been reported that the median cost of defending 
claims of patent infringement brought by an NPE ranges between 
$600,000, where less than $1 million is at risk, to $4 million, where more 
than $25 million is at risk.13  As one commentator has noted: “even the 
weakest of claims” presents a “Hobson’s Choice,” where the defendant can 
choose between “settl[ing] and giv[ing] the plaintiff remedies to which it is 
not entitled, or spend[ing] a larger sum to prevail without any realistic 
prospect of fee recoupment.”14 
“Trolling” is increasing.  According to a study that analyzed all 
13,000 patent infringement cases for the years 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012, 
the percentage of suits brought by PMEs (excluding universities) increased 
from 24.6 percent in 2007 to 58.7 percent in 2012.15  Meanwhile, the number of 
overall defendants in patent infringement lawsuits increased by about 129 
percent from 2007 to 2011, with 89 percent of the increase attributable to 
software-related patents16—rumored favorites of the troll tribe. 
The scope of patent troll “problem” is matched only by the scope of 
the “solutions” being proposed.  This note will seek to consider the scope 
of the laws and all manner of other “solutions” being proposed, threatened 
and implemented in an effort to cure the patent troll problem.  Admittedly, 
the consideration of each individual solution may, in some cases, be high-
level. Many of the proposed solutions warrant an entire note unto 
themselves, and it is beyond the scope of this note to present every possible 




 12.  See Randal R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls Pay in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-
trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0. 
 13.  AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2013 35 (2013). 
 14.  Brief for Petitioner at 3, Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness, 134 S.Ct. 1749 
(2014) (No. 12-1184). 
 15.  Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195. 
 16.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property: Assessing 
Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality 14 (2013). 
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Nevertheless, in surveying the range of proposed solutions this note 
will try to swing the conversation back into the neighborhood of 
objectivity, and will consider each proposed “solution” against the 
backdrop of the statutory framework in which “trolling” is conducted. 
Additionally, this note will seek to identify the potential issues with various 
“solutions,” including the impact of the solutions not only on patent trolls, 
but also, arguably more importantly, on the patent system as a whole. 
Ultimately, this note will endorse certain approaches and condemn others. 
If this has piqued your interest, then read on.  What follows is a very 
brief background of the patent system and its purposes in Section II; a 
discussion of Executive Branch activism relating to trolling in Section 
III.A.; a discussion of Judicial Branch activism relating to trolling in 
Section III.B.; a discussion of Legislative Branch (federal and state) 
activism relating to trolling in Section III.C.; recommendations in Section 
IV; and concluding thoughts in Section V. 
Spoiler alert: based on our review of all of the activism related to 
trolling, we recommend the following approaches, which balance the 
purposes of the patent system, including maintaining the value of said 
system, with the property rights of a patent owner: increasing the quality of 
patents through (1) increased training of patent examiners and (2) increased 
participation of the public through crowdsourcing of prior art discovery; 
revising discovery rules to better balance the cost burden of requesting and 
complying with discovery requests; implementing a two-way fee-shifting 
scheme; increasing the pleading standards for patent cases (including direct 
infringement); closing the procedural loophole in Section 299 regarding 
joinder; and adopting local rules that provide early case dispositive check-
valves. 
 
II.   Background 
 
The Constitution provides the foundation for the patent system in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which states, “[t]he Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective . . . Discoveries.”17  As an indication of the relative importance 
of a patent system to our founders, the First Congress of the United States 
enacted the first Patent Act in 1790.  The current patent laws are based on 
the Patent Act of 1952, as codified in Title 35 of the United States Code 
(“Code”), and were most recently updated by the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act18, which was signed into law on September 16, 2011. 
 
 17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (2011) (125 Stat. 284-341). 
JARED SMITH ARTICLE_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2015  5:03 PM 
220 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
A patent issued by the United States confers a twenty-year “exclusive 
right” in the form of a “grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States, or importing into the United 
States . . . .”19  Notably, a patent does not provide a positive right to make, 
use, or sell the invention.20  Rather, as the Supreme Court has explained, a 
patentee’s right to exclude others is the “very essence of the right conferred 
by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not 
use it, without question of motive.”21 
Like most types of property, patents and patent applications are 
transferrable (i.e. they can be bought, sold, licensed, etc.).  Specifically, Section 
261 states that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property” and “shall 
be assignable.”22  More importantly, not only is the entire patent transferable, but 
the individual rights granted to a patent owner are also transferrable.23  And 
beneficiaries of these rights (e.g. assignees and licensees) are entitled to exploit 
their patent rights (or not) in the same ways as the original inventors, and 
“without question of motive.”24 
Infringement of a patent occurs when “whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent . . . .”25 And all patent owners—whether 
original or successors-in-interest—are promised a “remedy by civil action” 
when their patents are infringed.26 
The Supreme Court has articulated several purposes of the patent system: 
 
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, 
it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further 
innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention 
once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for 
patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain 
remain there for the free use of the public.27 
 
 19.  35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2014). 
 20.  See General Information Concerning Patents, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_ patents.jsp#heading-1 (last 
updated Apr. 4, 2012). 
 21.  Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) 
(emphasis added) (There, the Supreme Court opined that “Congress ha[d] not overlooked the 
subject of nonuser of patented inventions.”); see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 
599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose 
of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.”). 
 22.  35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2014). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 429. 
 25.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 26.  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2014). 
 27.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Craig A. Nard, THE 
LAW OF PATENTS 3 (2d ed. 2011) (stating the patent system exists to “offer a potential financial reward 
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Thus, the patent system exists as “a carefully crafted bargain that 
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful 
advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited 
period of time.”28  And more specifically, the limited monopoly provided by a 
patent is “intended to motivate the creative activity of . . . inventors by the 
provision of a special reward . . .”29 where the “special reward” is “property in 
[the inventor’s] inventions . . . of which the law intended to give him the 
absolute enjoyment and possession.”30 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, there are inherent costs associated 
with the patent system: 
 
On the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides 
monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery.  On the other hand, that very exclusivity can 
impede the flow of information that might permit, indeed 
spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the 
patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to 
conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing 
patents and pending patent applications, and requiring the 
negotiation of complex licensing arrangements.31 
 
Thus, the patent system must seek to balance the competing interest of 
motivating innovation through patent rights with avoiding monopolies that 
unnecessarily stifle competition.”32 
Critically, neither the Constitution nor the patent laws derived therefrom 
make any distinction in patent rights based on the identity of the patent owner.  Put 
differently, the patent laws are generally agnostic to ownership.  Consequently, the 
patent laws are applied in the same way whether the patent owner is an individual 
or a legal entity, whether or not the patent owner is original or a successor-in-
interest, and whether or not the patent owner is exploiting the patented invention or 
licensing others too—even if that license is compelled. 
So, what we are left with is a patent system that, unfortunately, has few 
mechanisms to filter harmful behavior (e.g., “trolling”) from beneficial behavior 
(e.g., investment and innovation).  And as alluded to above, the patent laws 
provide little in the way of defensible positions that “trolling” is truly bad 
behavior—at least as far as the law is concerned.  Notwithstanding, next we will 
consider many of the proposed solutions to the . . . problem? 
 
as an inducement to invent, to disclose technical information, to invest capital in the innovation 
process, and to facilitate efficient use and manufacturing of invention through licensing.”). 
 28.  Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989). 
 29.  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 30.  Ex parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824). 
 31.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
 32.  Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 63. 
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                      III.     Analysis 
 
A.    Executive Branch Activism 
 
1.    The President 
  
 i.     Executive Actions to Combat Patent Trolls 
 
President Obama does not like patent trolls.  In his most recent (2014) State 
of the Union Address, President Obama called on Congress to “pass a patent 
reform bill that allows our businesses to stay focused on innovation, not costly, 
needless litigation”33—a thinly-veiled reference to the so-called patent troll 
problem.  And referring to the recently implemented America Invents Act 
(AIA), which includes some provisions34 meant to curb trolling behavior, the 
President admonished that “our efforts at patent reform only went about halfway 
to where we need to go.”35 
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that the White House has 
issued a variety of executive actions “designed to protect innovators from 
frivolous litigation and ensure the highest-quality patents in our system.”36 
Specifically, in June of 2013, the White House issued five executive 
actions, including two that mentioned “patent trolls” by name37: 
 
 
1. Making “Real Party-in-Interest” the New Default. 
Patent trolls often set up shell companies to hide their 
activities and enable their abusive litigation and extraction of 
settlements. This tactic prevents those facing litigation from 
knowing the full extent of the patents that their adversaries hold 
when negotiating settlements, or even knowing connections 
between multiple trolls. The PTO will begin a rulemaking process 
to require patent applicants and owners to regularly update 
ownership information when they are involved in proceedings 
before the PTO, specifically designating the “ultimate parent 
entity” in control of the patent or application. . . 
3. Empowering Downstream Users. Patent trolls are 
increasingly targeting Main Street retailers, consumers and 
other end-users of products containing patented technology— 
for instance, for using point-of-sale software or a particular 
 
 33.  President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address. 
 34.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 35.  President Barack Obama, Remarks at Google+ Hangout (Feb. 14, 2014) (video available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ4Zo0XyNsw) (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 36.  Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jun. 4, 
2013),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-
tech-patent-issues [hereinafter Executive Actions]. 
 37.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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business method. End-users should not be subject to lawsuits 
for simply using a product as intended, and need an easier way 
to know their rights before entering into costly litigation or 
settlement. The PTO will publish new education and outreach 
materials, including an accessible, plain-English web site 
offering answers to common questions by those facing 
demands from a possible troll. 
 
Notably, “making real party-in-interest the new default” is unlikely to 
do much to squelch trolling for at least a few reasons.38  First, the person 
with the rights necessary to assert a patent against a defendant already has 
to be a party to any lawsuit.39  Knowing whom that party is related to is, at 
best, cold comfort to a defendant. Second, for years the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has provided a publically accessible system 
for identifying patent owners of record.40  And the system is searchable 
both by patent number and by assignee name so that, for example, a single 
search could return many patents owned by a particular patent troll.  To be 
fair, assignments are not always recorded and knowing the relationship 
between different entities could assist in an effort to ascertain the scope of 
the collective’s patent holdings.  But the reality is that this is a very large 
hoop placed very close to the ground that any patent troll can easily jump 
through. 
“Empowering downstream users” by providing “education and 
outreach materials” is a nice thought, but all the free advice in the world is 
unlikely to scare off patent trolls that stand to make millions off their 
portfolios.  As frustrating as it is, settling with a patent troll for “nuisance 
value”—despite the merits—is often as financially sensible from the 
defendant’s side as it is lucrative from the plaintiff’s (i.e., troll’s) side.  One 
wonders what kind of free advice can possibly unravel the patent troll’s 
otherwise very efficient business model. 
And as a side note, contrary to the executive action, end-users of 
“products containing [valid] patented technology” should be willing to pay 
for that right, or otherwise be subject to a lawsuit and liable for damages. 
Otherwise, what is the point of the patent system? 
In February 2014, after a renewed call for “meaningful legislation to 
combat patent trolls,” the White House issued a status report on the 
previous executive actions and issued three additional executive actions, 
 
 38.  However, real party-in-interest and privity considerations are proving to be dispositive 
issues for post grant proceedings, such as inter partes reviews. See, e.g., Ryan Davis, PTAB Says 
VMWare Too Late with Patent Review Petition (Mar. 9, 2015) available at http://www.law360. 
com/ articles/629225/ptab-says-vmware-too-late-with-patent-review-petition. 
 39.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest.”). 
 40.  See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignments.uspto.gov/ 
assignments/q?db=pat (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
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which related to (1) crowd-sourcing prior art; (2) increasing training at the 
USPTO; and (3) expanding pro-bono and pro-se assistance programs for 
inventors who lack legal representation.41 Crowd-sourcing prior art is 
described in more detail below.42 
Increasing training at the USPTO can possibly improve the patent troll 
situation, albeit indirectly. One of the chief complaints of anti-troll 
advocates is that trolls only sue on worthless patents that should have never 
been issued.  While that rhetoric is demonstrably false in the aggregate, it is 
certainly true in certain cases.  In any event, improving the quality of 
examination at the USPTO should, over the long term, reduce the number 
of low-quality patents that make their way into patent troll’s hands—or 
anyone’s hands for that matter.  Everyone wins (even patent trolls) when 
patent applications undergo a higher quality examination. 
 
 ii.     Executive Recommendations for Legislation to Combat Patent         
      Trolls 
 
In conjunction with the executive actions, the White House has issued 
seven legislative recommendations, of which the following are most 
relevant to patent trolls: 
 
1. Require patentees and applicants to disclose the 
“Real Party-in-Interest,” by requiring that any party sending 
demand letters, filing an infringement suit or seeking PTO 
review of a patent to file updated ownership information, and 
enabling the PTO or district courts to impose sanctions for 
non-compliance. 
2. Permit more discretion in awarding fees to 
prevailing parties in patent cases, providing district courts 
with more discretion to award attorney’s fees under 35 USC 
285 as a sanction for abusive court filings (similar to the legal 
standard that applies in copyright infringement cases). 
3. Expand the PTO’s transitional program for covered 
business method patents to include a broader category of 
computer-enabled patents and permit a wider range of 
challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the 
Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB). 
 
 41.  See Fact Sheet: Executive Actions: Answering the President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent 
System and Foster Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p 
[hereinafter Executive Actions II].   
 42.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
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4. Protect off-the-shelf use by consumers and 
businesses by providing them with better legal protection 
against liability for a product being used off-the-shelf and 
solely for its intended use. Also, stay judicial proceedings 
against such consumers when an infringement suit has also 
been brought against a vendor, retailer, or manufacturer . . . 
6. Use demand letter transparency to help curb abusive 
suits, incentivizing public filing of demand letters in a way 
that makes them accessible and searchable to the public.43 
 
Starting at the top, requiring patentees and applicants to disclose the 
“real party-in-interest,” is mostly a house-keeping measure.  As mentioned 
above, it is already necessary to name the real party-in-interest on any 
formal complaint.44  Thus, it is unlikely that having to disclose this information 
at other times will deter a patent troll from pursuing an alleged infringer. 
Permitting more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent 
cases, on the other hand, has bite.  As discussed, infra Section III(C)(3), less than 
a year after the White House issued its legislative recommendations, the 
Supreme Court preempted Congress and unanimously overruled the Federal 
Circuit’s Brooks Furniture “exceptional” case standard, noting that existing 
standard was “unduly rigid.”45 
Ultimately, granting more discretion to district courts should deter all 
plaintiffs (including patent trolls) from filing frivolous suits thereby 
deterring abusive litigation behavior. 
Expanding the PTO’s transitional Covered Business Method Review 
(“CBM”) program “to include a broader category of computer-enabled 
patents and permit a wider range of challengers” could prove problematic 
in view of the performance of the current program.  As it is currently 
implemented, CMB review allows a party that has been sued for 
infringement (or who otherwise has standing to bring a declaratory 
judgment action) to challenge the validity of a financial business method 
patent in a trial before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)46—on 
any ground of patentability.47  This is in stark contrast to other post-grant 
review procedures that limit the grounds to novelty and obviousness and 
 
 43.  See Executive Actions, supra note 36. 
 44.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest.”). 
 45.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755-56 (2014). 
 46.  Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, UNITED STATES PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/faqs_ covered_business 
_method.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). 
 47.  See Id. (response to Question CBMR4040).  
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severely restrict the evidence to prove the same.48  Congress established the 
“transitional” (read: experimental) CBM program to provide alleged 
infringers with an alternative method to challenge patent validity that is 
quicker and cheaper than litigation.49  And by limiting the program to 
“covered business methods”—a favorite of patent trolls—Congress has 
conspicuously targeted trolling behavior. 
However, the current CBM program has many glaring issues.  First, it 
defines a covered business method patent incredibly broadly as one “that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing 
or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of 
financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents 
for technology inventions.”50  Thus, “technology inventions” are the only 
safe harbor.  Unfortunately, the definition of a “technology invention” is far 
from clear.  Rather, the rules state that figuring whether an invention is a 
“technology invention” requires “a case-by-case” determination of 
“whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological 
feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical 
problem using a technical solution.”51  So . . . a technology invention is just 
a claim with a technological feature that solved a technical problem using a 
technical solution . . . technically, at least.  In any event, the carve-out for 
“technology inventions” provides no clear guideposts to a safe harbor for 
those prosecuting patents now. 
The results of the CBM program have been, perhaps not surprisingly, 
controversial.  A review of the PTAB’s final written decisions issued as of 
early April 2014 reveals that the PTAB canceled 100% of all claims (249 
of 249 claims in 10 CBMs) for which trial was instituted.52  Statistics like 
these have led Chief Judge Rader to characterize the PTAB as “death 
squads . . . killing property rights.”53 And one has to wonder whether the 
USPTO sees the irony in invalidating patents it issued at such an alarming 
 
 48.  See, e.g., Comparison of Post-Grant Procedures Before and After The America Invents Act, 
RATNERPRESTIA, http://www.rppostgrant.com/ComparisonCharts/post-grant-review-comparison.html (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2014) (comparison chart). 
 49.  Kenneth N. Nigon, Post Grant Review, Inter Partes Review and Transitional Program for 
Covered Business Method Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com 
/2012/08/29/post-grant-review-inter-partes-review-and-transitional-program-for-covered-business-method-
patents/id=27668/. 
 50.  37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1), (2011). 
 51.  37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(2), (2011). 
 52.  Michelle Carniaux & Julia Tanase, IPR and CBM Statistics, KENYON & KENYON (April 
7, 2014), http://interpartesreviewblog.com (detailed statistics available at 
http://interpartesreviewblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FORMATTED-IPR-CBM-Stats-
Handout-4.pdf). 
 53.  Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling a Major Judicial Failure, Rader Says, LAW360 
(Oct. 25, 2013 6:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/482264/software-patent-ruling-a-major-
judicial-failure-rader-says. 
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rate.  Either way, it is a frightening proposition to expand a program to 
include a broader category of computer-enabled patents when the existing 
death squad, err, program, is already killing patents at a “draconian”54 rate. 
And as discussed further, below, it is even more frightening that Congress 
is considering expanding the CBM program to all subject areas—and 
making it permanent. 
Protecting “off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses” by providing 
them with better legal protection against liability for a product being used off-
the-shelf and solely for its intended use is flat out contrary to law.  In the 
context of a patented apparatus, the patent laws only ask whether an alleged 
infringer is making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing an infringing 
product; there is no consideration whatsoever of whether the product is being 
used as it is supposed to be, i.e., for its intended use.55 
Finally, requiring demand letter transparency by, for example, 
incentivizing public filing of demand letters in a way that makes them 
accessible and searchable to the public, has been rationalized because 
sending demand letters is “[the] kind of activity that belongs in the same 
family as other types of unfair and deceptive trade practices.”56  However, it 
is possible that such requirements would have the unintended consequences 
of (1) chilling legitimate efforts to put legitimate infringers on notice, which 
may raise First Amendment concerns, as well as (2) impacting a patent 
owners ability to market and license inventions, which undermines the patent 
owner’s fundamental right to exclude.  Moreover, such a regulation would 
burden all patent owners alike, not just patent trolls.  So at least insofar as 
limiting trolling behavior goes, requiring demand letter transparency does not 
appear to be an effective solution. 
 
2.    The USPTO 
 
The USPTO57 has responded to the executive actions with various rule 
changes and initiatives.  The most significant proposed rule change would 
establish increased transparency of patent ownership during patent 
prosecution and at designated times throughout the life of the patent.58 
 
 54.  Robert G. Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable 
Patents Invalid?, IPWatchdog (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-
death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/. 
 55.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2014) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 56.  Jeff Sistrunk, Congress Urged to Act on Abusive Patent Troll Leaders, LAW360 (Apr. 9, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/526310/ congress-urged-to-act-on-abusive-patent-troll-
letters. 
 57.  The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is an office of the executive 
branch within the Department of Commerce. 
 58.  Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (proposed 
Jan. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R § 1). 
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Specifically, the rule would require the “attributable owner” including the 
“ultimate parent entity” to be identified when an application is filed, when 
there is a change in ownership during prosecution of the application, at the 
time the issue fee and maintenance fees are due, and any time the patent is 
challenged in a USPTO proceeding (such as a reexamination proceeding).59 
Professor Robin Feldman of the University of California Hastings College 
of the Law, criticized the proposed rule by saying, “[t]he patent office is 
asking for information at key moments, but those moments are too few and 
far between,” leaving out “a lot of critical time in the life of a patent.”60  
But even if the information were required more often, would it really affect 
trolling behavior?  Probably not. 
Most critics of trolling behavior would acknowledge that patent trolls are 
rarely if ever the original inventor, owner, or assignee of a patent application or 
issued patent.  Rather, as Chief Judge Rader noted,61 patent trolls usually 
acquire interest and ownership in that patent well after prosecution is complete. 
So rules designed to make ownership more transparent during prosecution are 
not likely to illuminate much with respect to trolls. 
Moreover, increasing the transparency of patent ownership during any 
stage of the patent’s life does not change much substantively with respect 
to asserting that patent against a defendant, except maybe whose name 
shows up in a pleading’s caption.  And, identifying the “attributable owner” 
would not affect the procedures that the USPTO follows when an issued 
patent is challenged by a defendant through, for example, an ex parte 
reexamination,62 an inter partes reexamination,63 or a CBM review.64  
Thus, as with the similar executive action discussed above, this is more of a 
house-keeping measure than an effective measure against patent trolls. 
Another initiative being undertaken by the USPTO is the development 
of a better mechanism to enable crowdsourcing of prior art.65  The initiative 
is meant to increase the ability of companies, subject matter experts, and 
the public to “crowdsource” prior art and to submit it to the USPTO in an 
effort to drive better patentability determinations.66  It is widely acknowledged 
that patent examiners have too little time in most cases (and perhaps too 
little incentive in others) to complete a comprehensive review of the art. 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Ryan Davis, USPTO Patent Transparency Plan Won’t Stop Trolls, LAW360 (Jan. 27, 
2014 7:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/504233/uspto-patent-transparency-plan-won-t-
stop-trolls. 
 61.  See Rader, supra, note 12. 
 62.  See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.501-1.625. 
 63.  See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.902-1.997, 42.108-42.207. 
 64.  See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.300-42.304. 
 65.  Executive Actions II, supra note 40. 
 66.  Id. 
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Crowdsourcing the search for relevant art—particularly by interested 
parties like potential defendants—could lessen the burden on the USPTO 
and increase the quality of examination. The White House believes that 
increasing third-party submissions of prior art will “help ensure that U.S. 
patents are of the highest quality.”67 
It is worth noting, however, that the AIA has already instituted a form 
of crowdsourcing through third-party pre-issuance submissions, and those 
procedures have not been widely utilized.68  Additionally, the public has 
been able to formally submit prior art to the USPTO through the provisions 
of 35 U.S.C. § 301 since at least 1981.69  Notwithstanding, just like providing 
additional training to USPTO examiners, this measure may help the trolling 
problem indirectly by reducing the proliferation of low quality (but otherwise 
perfectly exploitable) patents. 
 
B.    Legislative Activism 
 
1.    The America Invents Act (Enacted) 
 
The America Invents Act (AIA), signed into law on September 26, 2011, 
significantly updated the Patent Act of 1952.  While the AIA made many 
significant changes to the patent laws generally, the following is a discussion 
of certain provisions that may affect patent trolls. 
 
 Joinder and Consolidation 
 
Before passage of the AIA, courts performed joinder and consolidation of 
parties for patent litigation in accordance with Rule 20 and Rule 42 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).70  Under these rules, patent trolls 
“commonly employ[ed] a litigation strategy of initiating infringement suits 
against large numbers of unrelated, geographically diverse defendants in 
venues friendly to patent plaintiffs . . . .”71 Joining multiple defendants in a single 
complaint offered several advantages to patent trolls, including reduced litigation 
 
 67.  Executive Actions II, supra note 40. 
 68.  Gene Quinn, PTO Seeks Comments on Crowdsourcing Prior Art, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 
26, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/26/pto-seeks-comments-on-crowdsourcing-prior 
-art/id=48724/. 
 69.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 2014). 
 70.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: 
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect 
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) 
join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions . . . .”). 
 71.  Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 673, 674 (2012).  
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costs, improved forum selection, reduced likelihood that defendants would be 
able to transfer the case to an undesirable forum, and reduced risk of inconsistent 
validity or claim construction determinations.72 
On the other side of the ‘v,’ multiple defendant lawsuits tend to be 
inherently more complex for the individual defendants because, for 
example, there is an “exponential” increase in logistics and competing interests 
among defendants.73  The complexity, in-turn, increases the perceived cost of 
litigation, compels defendants to settle, and places additional pressure on 
remaining defendants to do the same.74  Additionally, often the co-defendants 
to these multi-defendant lawsuits are competitors, which increases tension 
between the defendants and prevents any marginal benefits of sharing the 
defense burden.  Thus, suing numerous defendants in a single action has 
been an effective strategy for patent trolls in districts that allowed plaintiffs 
to join defendants based solely on the allegation they had infringed that 
same patent.75 
Section 19(d) of the AIA amended 35 U.S.C. § 299 to prevent courts 
from joining unrelated defendants under certain circumstances.76  Under the 
AIA, a court may join parties accused of infringement or consolidate their 
actions for trial only if the parties are alleged to be jointly or severally 
liable, or if the defendants’ alleged infringements arose out of the same 
transaction or occurrence, and there are questions of fact common to all 
defendants.77 Unlike before, a court cannot join accused infringers nor 
consolidate their actions for trial “based solely on allegations that they each 
have infringed the . . . patents in suit.”78 Commentators have speculated 
that the purpose of the change is to increase litigation costs for patent trolls 
and to prevent unfettered forum shopping.79 
 
 72.  Id. at 674-75; Scott W. Burt, Barry F. Irwin & Jonathan B. Tropp, Intellectual Property 
Owners Association Litigation Committee White Paper: Impact of the Misjoinder Provision of the 
America Invents Act 8 (2012) available at http://www.ipo.org/ wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ whitepaper 
_misjoinder1.pdf. 
 73.  Brian M. Buroker & Maya M. Eckstein, Multiple Defendant Patent Infringement Cases: 
Complexities, Complications and Advantages 1 (2007) available at http://www.hunton.com/files 
/Publication/e7e49e13-2327-4d36-a04c1dcc301527c4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b2cc8f60-
eb07-41f7-8949787a644f1cff/Multiple_Defendant_Paper_ AIPLA.pdf).  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Bryant, supra note 71, at 675. 
 76.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011); see also Burt, supra 
note 74, at 7 (“[The] legislative history reveals, Section 299 was intended to resolve a split of 
authority among the district courts relating to joinder under [Rule 20].”). 
 77.  35 U.S.C.A. § 299(a) (West 2014). 
 78.  35 U.S.C.A. § 299(b) (West 2014). 
 79.  Alison Frankel, Patent Trolls and Multidistrict Litigation: It’s Complicated, REUTERS (May 
10, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/05/10/patent-trolls-and-multidistrict-litigation-
its-complicated/. 
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In practice, the new joinder rules have resulted in fewer multiple-
defendant patent infringement suits,80 but patent trolls have countered by 
increasing the number of filings against individual defendants who would 
have previously been named in a single complaint.81 And while AIA 
Section 299 prevents joinder and consolidation of multiple unrelated parties 
for trial, it does not explicitly “prevent the consolidation or coordination of 
multiple cases for purposes of pre-trial activities,”82 such as discovery and 
claim construction, which can be astronomically expensive activities for 
the defendants especially.  Discovery is particularly troubling in this context 
because patent trolls usually have little in the way of discovery burdens 
because many patent trolls do not do anything other than sue.  On the other 
hand, defendants (often high-tech companies) are faced with the unnerving 
task of spilling their company secrets over and over again to patent trolls 
and within earshot of their fiercest competitors within the same lawsuits. 
Patent trolls are employing at least two strategies to circumvent the 
spirit of Section 299.  First, some patent trolls are employing multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) procedures to bind cases for pre-trial activities.83  
 Specifically, patent trolls are relying on Section 1407 of Title 28 of the 
U.S. Code, which states: “[w]hen civil actions involving one or more 
common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions 
may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.”84  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPMDL) 
administers MDL, and may transfer an action on its own initiative or in 
response to a motion filed by a party to the action.85  Thus MDL procedures 
have been used as an end-run around the new joinder rules.  On a positive 
note, more patent trolls might be exploiting the MDL procedures but for the 
fact that employing MDL means losing control over the venue or judge for 
MDL proceedings86—the JPMDL chooses both.87 
Second, and perhaps more devious, patent trolls have purposefully 
incorporated in Delaware to collocate with a large pool of defendants.88 
This strategy effectively prevents defendants incorporated in Delaware 
 
 80.  Burt, supra note 74, at 3. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 83.  See, e.g., In re Bear Creek Technologies Inc., 2013 WL 3789471 (D. Del. 2013) 
(transferring actions from Eastern District of Virginia to the District of Delaware as a MDL). 
 84.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a) (West 2014). 
 85.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(c) (West 2014). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 2014). 
 88.  Frankel, supra note 81. 
JARED SMITH ARTICLE_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2015  5:03 PM 
232 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
from seeking a transfer to a more convenient forum.  And because Delaware is 
a relatively small forum, patent cases are routinely assigned to the same 
judge,89 which tends to result in consolidation.  Thus, a patent troll can 
exploit the likelihood that multiple defendants reside in a single forum in 
order to circumvent the amended joinder rules and to combine separate 
actions related merely by the same patents-in-suit for pre-trial activities. 
In sum, while the new AIA joinder rules have the best intentions, they 
fall short of really impacting a primary strategy of patent trolls: forcing 
many defendants into disadvantageous defense groups in an effort promote 
quick, often “nuisance value” settlements. 
 
Post Grant Challenges 
 
The AIA implemented three new post grant procedures: inter partes 
review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method 
patent review (CBMR).  CBMR was previously discussed, above.  IPR is 
similar to the pre-existing inter partes reexamination procedure available 
before the AIA.  But PGR is all new and merits some discussion. 
PGR became available on March 16, 2013.  In order to instigate a 
PGR, a petition must be filed within nine months after issuance of the 
patent.90  What makes PGR significant relative to IPR is that a broader 
range of challenges may be made in a PGR petition.  Specifically, the PGR 
petition can be based on Sections 101 (subject matter), 102 (novelty), 103 
(obviousness) and 112 (written description, except for best mode),91 
whereas IPR can only be based on Sections 102 and 103.  Further, prior art 
is not limited to patents or printed publications in PGR like it is in IPR.  
Instead, evidence of public use, on-sale activity, or other public disclosures 
is admissible.92 
However, the additional avenues of attacking a patent’s validity in 
PGR are not provided without risk.  Perhaps most daunting, the estoppel 
created by PGR applies to all USPTO proceedings, ITC proceedings, and 
district court litigations.93  Additionally, the estoppel attaches immediately 
upon a determination of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, rather than 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Post Grant Review, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www. 
uspto.gov/aia_implementation/faqs_post_grant_review.jsp#heading-3 (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
 91.  See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 
48,684 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
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after all possible appeals like an IPR.94  So, in essence, if a petitioner’s 
argument does not carry the day during PGR, then it will never carry the 
day, and it will immediately eviscerate that party’s ability to challenge the 
validity of the PGR’ed patent in a later district court or ITC case. 
As discussed above, patent trolls typically are not the original owners 
or assignees of a patent.  Therefore, it is hard to characterize post-grant 
review as an “anti-troll” provision.  However, as discussed in the context of 
other provisions, post-grant review may indirectly improve the issue of 
patent trolling by eliminating bad patents well before they can be found, 




The AIA substantially expanded the scope and applicability of the 
prior-user defense beyond the previous version codified in Section 273.95  
Notably, the revised Section 273 expands the scope of the defense to cover 
almost all patents.  “One specific reason for this broadening amendment 
was to specifically insulate businesses from having to disclose their internal 
processes or manufacturing materials”96 by defensively patenting them and 
thereby making them public record.  Another notable change is that new 
Section 273 expanded the scope of the entities that can assert the defense.  
Specifically, Section 273(e)(1)(A) now expands the defense to “the person 
who performed or directed the performance of the commercial use described in 
subsection (a), or by an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common 
control with such person.”97  According to the Congressional record, the new 
provision is intended to expand the defense to include contractors, vendors, 
or other third parties over whom the person asserting the defense had 
control.98 
As a result of the AIA, an accused infringer may now assert the prior-
user defense under Section 273 against any claimed invention in any patent 
that issues on or after September 16, 2011, provided that the accused 
infringer commercially used the subject matter in the United States at least 
one year prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention.99 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Jeff Mikrut, How the America Invents Act Revived the Prior-User Defense, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb. 20, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/ 
winter2012-prior-user-defense-america-invents-act.html; see also generally 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2010). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  35 U.S.C.A. § 273(e)(1)(A) (West 2014). 
 98.  See 157 CONG. REC. S5430–31 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 99.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (West 2014). 
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Here again, this change to the law is not patent-troll-specific, but it 
nevertheless addresses a tendency of patent trolls to shop for patents that 
are already widely practiced by companies.  The expanded prior-user defense 
under Section 273 may significantly shorten a patent troll’s timeframe to locate, 
acquire, and assert a patent against an already practicing entity.  At the same 
time, this change strikes a balance with the broader purposes of the patent 
system by allowing a patent to issue despite prior uses that do not qualify as 
prior art (e.g. trade secret use) such that the patent can be asserted against those 
that do not qualify as prior users. 
 
2.    Innovation Act 
 
The Innovation Act (H.R. 3309) is a bill currently being considered by 
Congress with the conspicuous purpose of curbing patent trolling.  The 
Innovation Act passed in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming 
majority (325-91) on December 5, 2013.  The Innovation Act includes many 
provisions from other, concurrent bills that are being considered with varying 
levels of support.  As such, consideration of the following key anti-troll 
provisions associated with this particular bill will act as a proxy for other bills 
with similar provisions. 
 
Revised Exceptional Case Standard 
 
The Innovation Act proposed a hybrid loser-pays system.  Under the 
proposed Innovation Act, a revised Section 285 provided that “[t]he court 
shall award, to a prevailing party, reasonable fees . . . unless the court finds 
that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were 
reasonably justified in law and fact or that special circumstances (such as 
severe economic hardship to a named inventor) makes an award unjust.”100 
Proponents of the proposed fee shifting system believe it will “make it 
harder for trolls to use the extraordinary expense of patent litigation to 
force a settlement.”101  Ultimately, one of patent trolls’ biggest advantages 
to date has been the disparity of financial risk in undertaking a troll suit.  
Exacerbating this issue is the fact that many troll suits are run on 
contingency, which means that the patent trolls do not even have to pay 
 
 100.  Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 9, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 101.  Zachary Graves, New Proposal to Slay Patent Trolls Would be a Boon to the Digital 
Economy, HUFF POST TECH (Oct. 7, 2013 12:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zachary-
graves/new-proposal-to-slay-pate_b_4024831.html; see also Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software 
Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV 325, 369 (2012) (“Fee-shifting changes the economics by requiring an 
unsuccessful plaintiff to foot the defendant’s legal fees, punishing and deterring low-probability 
claims.”). 
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most of the attorney’s fees to litigate the case.  Contingency fee cases shift 
much of the financial burden to eager plaintiff’s attorneys looking for a big 
score.  Notably, though, a successful patent troll will also benefit from this 
change by having its fees paid by a losing defendant.102 
Opponents, on the other hand, believe that while fee shifting may 
deter frivolous claims, it will almost certainly deter meritorious claims as 
well.103  This is, of course, due to the increased financial risk to bring a case 
in such a system—even if the intentions and merits are solid.  It is certainly 
not a goal of the patent laws to prevent rightful owners from exercising their 
property rights.  Otherwise, the value of patents could be negatively impacted.  
Critics also point out that patent trolls may be able to circumvent loser-pays 
rules by suing under shell companies meant to insulate their investors from 
liability—a well-established practice among sophisticated patent trolls.104  
Though, Congress could mitigate this strategy by requiring plaintiffs to post a 
bond.105 
The Innovation Act was unable to gain traction in the Senate, and was 
withdrawn from consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 
2014.106  But as discussed, infra Section III(C)(3), in April 2014, the Supreme 
Court’s Octane Fitness and Highmark decisions granted district courts 
increased discretion to determine whether a case is “exceptional” under 
Section 285 and warrants an award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing 
party.107  While a step in the same direction as proposed by the Innovation 
Act, the Court’s decisions did not implement a loser-pays system, where 
fee shifting is the default rather than the exception. 
 
Heightened Pleading Standards 
 
The Innovation Act also proposed heightened pleading requirements 
compared to those required by FRCP Form 18.  Currently, the plaintiff only 
needs to identify the patent number; provide a brief description of the 
invention covered by the patent; allege that the defendant has infringed and 
is still infringing the patent by making, selling, or using a product that 
embodies the patented invention; and affirm that the plaintiff has given 
 
 102.  Chien, supra note 103, at 370. 
 103.  Id. at 373 (“[T]he real losers are those with credible but uncertain cases who cannot 
bear the risk of paying the opposing party’s costs if, despite the strength of the case, they 
nonetheless lose in Court.”). 
 104.  Id. at 382-83. 
 105.  Id. at 383. 
 106.  Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary 
Committee, On Patent Legislation (May 21, 2014), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-
of-senator-patrick-leahy-d-vt_chairman-senate-judiciary-committee-on-patent-legislation. 
 107.  Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755-56. 
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proper notice of infringement—either actual or constructive notice.108  The 
Innovation Act would have increased the requirements for the plaintiff such that 
the complaint would have to identify each alleged infringed patent and claim; 
and identify each accused instrumentality (process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter), including a specific product name or model number (if 
known).  Additionally, it would have required the plaintiff to state where each 
element of each claim is found within the accused instrumentality and how 
each limitation of each claim is met by the accused instrumentality109—a 
step that is presently performed much later in discovery. 
The proposed heightened patent pleading standards closely matched 
the local rules for the Eastern District of Texas, which require a party 
claiming patent infringement to serve on all parties a “Disclosure of Asserted 
Claims and Infringement Contentions” no later than 10 days before the Initial 
Case Management Conference pursuant to FRCP 26(f).110 
Heightened pleading standards may reduce the burden on a defendant to 
defend a suit with little or no information about the substance of the actual 
lawsuit.  Patent trolls have been known to cast wide nets and to rely on the 
pleading standards and broad discovery rules to essentially harass defendants 
into settling.  Thus, increasing the pleading standards could beneficially shift 
the burden back to the plaintiff to do more diligence before filing a suit, which, 
incidentally, could also increase the chances of an exceptional case finding 
where a patent troll really is acting frivolously.  Notably, pleading standards 
have already effectively been increased for claims of indirect infringement.111 
However, the desire to increase pleading standards has to be balanced 
by the reality that sometimes even the most well-intentioned and deserving 
plaintiff can only derive so much detail from publicly accessible information. 
For example, a patent holder may surmise that a piece of software is infringing a 
patent based on functional capabilities of that software, but may nonetheless be 
unable to prove anything without review of the source code, which could only 
happen through discovery in a lawsuit. 
Overall, heightening the direct infringement pleading standards seems 
like an obvious and effective choice for reducing frivolous litigation, 
whether or not it is brought by a patent troll.  Importantly, heightened 
pleading standards affect the possibility of a case ever being filed, and 
 
 108.  FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (Form 18). 
 109.  Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 9, 2013). 
 110.  See E.D. Tex. Civ. R. App. B (Local Civil Patent Rules), R. 3-1; see also N.D. Cal. 
Patent R. 3-1 (requiring a “Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions” within 
14 days of the Initial Case Management Conference). 
 111.  See, e.g., In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 
1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing heightened pleading standards for contributory and 
induced infringement). 
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provide immediate grounds for attack of a frivolous-looking suit.  Also, 
heightened pleading standards for direct infringement would bring the 
standards more in-line with the already heightened standards for indirect 
infringement.  Finally, as discussed more below, the Supreme Court’s 




The Innovation Act also addresses one of the most abused procedures 
during litigation—discovery.  Patent trolls are particularly apt to abuse the broad 
discovery rules because they typically have nothing that is discoverable and are 
therefore not bound by any desire to balance discovery.  Put differently, patent 
trolls always want it all, and they want it right now. 
To address these abuses, the Innovation Act includes a variety of 
provisions, including:  
 
(1) direct[ing] the Judicial Conference of the United States to 
develop discovery rules and procedures that address whether and 
to what extent each party to the action is: (a) entitled to receive 
specified categories of core documentary evidence and is to be 
responsible for the costs of producing such evidence within its 
possession or control; and (b) permitted to seek any additional 
document discovery if the requesting party bears the reasonable 
costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, of the additional 
discovery;  
(2) provid[ing] for discovery of electronic communications 
(including emails, text messages, or instant messages) only if the 
parties determine that it is appropriate under procedures that 
address whether such discovery is to occur after the parties 
have exchanged initial disclosures and core documentary 
evidence;  
(3) direct[ing] the Judicial Conference to consider a prohibition 
that would bar additional document discovery unless: (a) the 
parties mutually agree otherwise; or (b) the requesting party posts a 
bond, or provides security, in an amount sufficient to cover the 
expected costs or shows that it has the financial capacity to pay 
such costs;  
(4) requires the Judicial Conference to consider whether courts, in 
response to a motion, may: (a) determine that a request for 
additional document discovery is excessive, irrelevant, or abusive; 
(b) modify discovery rules; or  
(c) include computer code in the discovery of core documentary 
evidence.112 
 
 112.  See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6 (as passed by the House, Dec. 9, 2013). 
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Taken together, these provisions primarily seek to formalize certain 
types of “core” discovery to avoid disputes, and more importantly, to shift 
the cost burden of discovery onto the requesting party in many circumstances.  
Shifting the cost burden to the requester could be a real game changer given that 
complex discovery in patent cases—much of which is completely useless 
gamesmanship—can cost millions of dollars.  And while these provisions are 
certainly not patent-troll specific, they may seriously undermine a common tactic 
of patent trolls, which is to push higher “nuisance values” of settlement based on 
the perceived cost of discovery. 
 
3.    Other Federal Bills 
 
The Innovation Act, discussed above, is one of the primary pieces of 
proposed anti-troll legislation being debated currently, and it draws many 
of its provisions from other bills that are being considered.  It is beyond the 
scope of this note to examine each and every proposed “anti-troll” bill if for 
no other reason than a new one seems to pop up every day.  But for the 
sake of completeness, in addition to the laws and bills already discussed 
herein, one might also consider the following proposed bills to get an idea 
of the range of direct and indirect anti-troll provisions: 
Patent Quality Improvement Act (S. 866), which would make the 
Covered Business Method review program available to all industries, and 
make the program permanent.113 
Patent Abuse Reduction Act (S. 1013), which contains a number of 
provisions to deal with patent troll litigation, including: (1) raising the 
pleading requirements; (2) fee shifting discovery costs for any requests 
beyond core documentary evidence; and (3) a two-way cost and fee-shifting 
provision (but no bond).114 
Patent Litigation Integrity Act (S. 1612), which would require the 
patent owner to post a bond against fees, with exceptions for companies 
that actually practice the patent or license to a company that practices the 
patent (this requirement is similar to the Patent Abuse Reduction Act).115 
Patent Transparency and Improvements Act (S. 1720), which focuses 
on end-user protection (similar to the Innovations Act), demand letters, and 
transparency of patent ownership (similar to the Innovations Act).116 
Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act (S. 2049), which sets 
minimum requirements for a notice of patent infringement and authorizes 
the Federal Trade Commission to enforce those requirements.117 
 
 113.  See Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 114.  See Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 115.  See Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 116.  See Patent Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes 
(SHIELD) Act (H.R. 845), which would force patent trolls to post a bond 
to cover a defendant’s legal fees and costs.118  
End Anonymous Patents Act (H.R. 2024), which would force patent 
owners, as well as other real parties in interest, to be transparent.119 
Patent Litigation and Innovation Act (H.R. 2639), which includes pleading, 
joinder, discovery provisions, sanctions, and end-user protection provisions.120 
Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act (STOP) (H.R. 2766), 
which would make the Covered Business Method review program applicable to 
all industries and make the program permanent.121 
Demand Letter Transparency Act (H.R. 3540), which would create 
a national database of demand letters that patent trolls must submit their 
letters to as well as minimum content for those demand letters.122 
Notably, though there are many bills pending in Congress, most of them 
share a core set of ideas, including: (1) transparency; (2) pleading requirements; 
(3) discovery modifications; and (4) expanded patent review provisions. 
   
4.    State Legislative Activism 
 
Despite patent law being federal law, states have recently jumped on the 
anti-troll bandwagon.  Specifically, states have recently proposed legislation 
designed to combat the use of deceptive “demand letters,” which patent trolls 
use to target small businesses and non-profit organizations (among others).  
Typically these demand letters make vague claims regarding fairly common 
end-user technology, and the demand letters threaten patent infringement 
litigation unless the recipient agrees to take a license. 
 Vermont was the first to respond legislatively by amending its consumer 
protection laws in 2013, making it a state crime to “make a bad faith assertion of 
patent infringement.”123  Vermont’s new law124 “established an open-ended 
subjective test to determine bad faith assertion, including eight factors tending to 
demonstrate bad faith and six factors indicating absence of bad faith.”125  The 
law also establishes a requirement for the patentee to post a bond of up to 
$250,000 to continue litigation where the court has established a “reasonable 
 
 117.  See Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 118.  See Saving High-Tech Innovators From Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 119.  See End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 120.  See Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 121.  See STOP Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 122.  See Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3540, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 123.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 124.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-99 (West 2014). 
 125.  Michael Sherby, Vermont’s Move to Target Patent Trolls, BAKER BOTTS (Jul. 2013), 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/IPReport201307-VermontsMovetoTargetPatentTrolls.htm; see 
also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (West 2014). 
JARED SMITH ARTICLE_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2015  5:03 PM 
240 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
likelihood” that the patentee “has made a bad faith assertion.”126  Oregon enacted 
a similar law to Vermont in 2014, including a multifactor balancing test to 
determine bad faith assertion.127  Additionally, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina have also introduced bad faith 
patent assertion bills.128 
A key question regarding the states treading into patent (federal) law 
territory is whether the federal patent laws will preempt the state laws under 
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.129  Federal precedent appears 
to bar liability for a patentee communicating its rights to an alleged infringer 
because “[p]atents would be of little value if infringers of them could not be 
notified of the consequences of infringement or proceeded against in the 
courts.  Such action considered by itself cannot be said to be illegal.”130  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has stated, “[s]tate tort claims against a patent 
holder . . . based on enforcing a patent in the market place, are preempted by 
federal patent laws, unless the claimant can show that the patent holder acted in 
bad faith in the publication or enforcement of its patent.”131  Vermont and the 
states that have followed its lead recognize the possibility of federal 
preemption and have crafted their bills to take advantage of the “bad faith” 
exception articulated by the Federal Circuit.132  Furthermore, attorneys general 
from forty-two states sent a letter to the Senate asking for an explicit provision 
supporting states’ rights to enforce state bad faith patent assertion laws.133 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of federal preemption of state 
patent-related laws in the seminal Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats case.134  
In Bonito Boats, the Court considered a Florida statute that prohibited the use of 
 
 126.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4198 (West 2014). 
 127.  See S. 1540, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014) (enacted). 
 128.  See S. 116, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014); S. 654, 126th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Me. 2013); Leg. 677, 103d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2014); Assemb. 2462, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.J. 2014); S. 1222, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014); H. 4629, 120th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2014). 
 129.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . shall 
be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
 130.  Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg., 227 U.S. 8, 37-38 (1913)); see also Sherby, supra 
note 125. 
 131.  800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 132.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(3) (West 2014) (“The General Assembly also 
recognizes that Vermont is preempted from passing any law that conflicts with federal patent 
law.”). 
 133.  Daniel Wilson, AGs Urge Federal Support for State Patent Troll Battles, LAW360 (Feb. 
25, 2014, 7:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/513117/ags-urge-federal-support-for-state-
patent-troll-battles. 
 134.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989).  
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a direct molding process used to duplicate unpatented boat hulls.135  The law 
would have prevented competitors from reverse engineering an unpatented 
commercially available product using a specific process, thereby granting the 
original manufacturer a partial monopoly outside the patent system.136 
To decide the case, the Court performed a conflict preemption analysis.137  
Conflict preemption applies “where compliance with both state and federal 
regulations is either a physical impossibility, or . . . stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of 
Congress.”138  The Court found that the Florida law, by offering “patent-like 
protection,” prevented the “ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is 
the centerpiece of federal patent policy.”139  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Court found the federal government had preempted the entire field of patent 
law.140  The Court stated, “[t]he patent statute’s careful balance between public 
right and private monopoly to promote certain creative activity is a scheme of 
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”141  The Court held that 
federal law preempted the statute because it offered “patent-like protection” for 
unpatented ideas.142 
While the statute considered in Bonito Boats is certainly different 
from the statutes enacted by Vermont and Oregon, Bonito Boats is still 
instructive for how the Supreme Court is likely to analyze preemption in 
the context of state bad faith patent assertion laws.  In view of Bonito Boats, 
it seems unlikely that the states will be given any “room” to supplement the 
Federal patent laws, even in the context of simple patent infringement demand 
letters.  Moreover, state-by-state enforcement of different laws regarding demand 
letters could create extreme uncertainty for patent owners who wish to assert 
their patent rights against infringers.  Even if every state adopted a similar 
subjective multifactor “bad faith” test, there would be significant variation 
in its application from state to state.  Such “[d]isuniformity in patent law” 
and “disparate circuit court treatment of patents” are disfavored and routinely 
cited as reasons for creation of the Federal Circuit.143 
 
 135.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167. 
 136.  Id. at 160. 
 137.  Id. at 156-57. 
 138.  Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Dist. of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 
(D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).  
 139.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156-57. 
 140.  Id. at 167. 
 141.  Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (emphasis 
added and internal quotations omitted). 
 142.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168. 
 143.  Nard, supra note 27, at 25. 
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Accordingly, the various state efforts to supplement the patent laws with 
state-specific provisions seem unlikely to survive a preemption analysis.  And 
as such, they are unlikely to impact patent trolls in any meaningful way. 
 
C.    Judicial Activism 
 
1.    Patentable Subject Matter 
 
Another possible avenue of limiting patent trolling is to limit their favorite 
patentable subject matter—business methods and other computer-implemented 
processes. 
Under Section 101 “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” is patent 
eligible.”144  However, the Supreme Court has identified “three specific 
exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”145 
Seminal cases in this area include: (1) Gottschalk v. Benson,146 where the 
Supreme Court held that “the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical 
formula may not be patented;”147 (2) Parker v. Flook,148 where the Supreme 
Court similarly stated that “if a claim is directed essentially to a method of 
calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific 
purpose, the claimed method” is not patentable;149 and (3) Diamond v. Diehr,150 
where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a mathematical formula in isolation is 
not patentable,151  but offered that “when a claim containing a mathematical 
formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, 
when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws 
were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different 
state or thing), then the claims satisfies the requirements of § 101.”152 
Based on these decisions, the Federal Circuit developed the “machine-or-
transformation test” for subject matter eligibility under Section 101.153  Under 
this test, a claim is eligible subject matter if it is “tied to a particular machine” or 
if it “transforms an article.”154 Additionally, the claimed machine or 
transformation “must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope” and “the 
involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not  
 
 144.  35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2014). 
 145.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 146.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 
 147.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63). 
 148.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 585. 
 149.  Id. at 595. 
 150.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981). 
 151.  Id. at 188. 
 152.  Id. at 192. 
 153.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (2008). 
 154.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
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merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.”155  However, in Bilski v 
Kappos,156 the Supreme Court held that the “machine-or-transformation test is 
not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process,’” 
rather it is a “useful and important clue” or “investigative tool.”157 Additionally, 
the Court held that business method patents are not categorically excluded 
subject matter.158 
After Bilski, the Federal Circuit (sitting en banc) further confused the 
issue in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation.159  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to answer the question of “[w]hether claims to computer-
implemented inventions, including claims to systems and machines, processes, 
and items of manufacture are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within 
the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this Court?”160 
In Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the two-step framework it set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) “for distinguishing 
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from 
those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”161  The first step 
is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts.”162  And the second step is to “consider the elements of each 
claim” to determine whether it contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to 
“transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.”163 
In this case, the Court considered claims to a “computer-implemented 
scheme for mitigating settlement risk by using a third-party intermediary.”164 
Applying the Mayo framework, the Court found the “claims at issue [were] 
directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement,” and “fail[ed] to 
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention” by “merely 
require[ing] generic computer implementation.”165  The Court explained, “the 
relevant question [was] whether the claims here [did] more than simply instruct 
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a 
generic computer.”166 
 
 155.  Id. at 961-62. 
 156.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
 157.  Id. at 3227. 
 158.  Id. at 3228; Cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012); Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (The 
Supreme Court addressed patent-eligible subject matter again in Mayo (laws of nature) and Myriad (natural 
phenomenon) but neither of these decisions provided clarification on patentability of software or business 
method patents). 
 159.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. PTY. LTD., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 160.  Question Presented: 13-298 Alice Corp. PTY. LTD. v. CLS Bank Int’l, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-00298qp.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 161.  Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 2351-52. 
 165.  Id. at 2357. 
 166.  Alice Corp. Pty., 134 S.Ct.. at 2359. 
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On the surface, the Court merely affirmed Mayo.  But as one informed 
commentator stated: “Based on this decision it is hard to see how any 
software patent claims written in method form can survive challenge.”167  
In fact, Alice has left a huge wake of turmoil regarding patent-eligible 
subject matter, with the courts invalidating software patents at an “alarming 
rate.”168  The Federal Circuit appears divided on its application of the Mayo 
Framework, with decisions highly dependent on the mix of panel members.  
For example, the Circuit’s decisions in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 
772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) are difficult to reconcile.169 
In Ultramercial, the court considered the patent-eligibility of claims 
directed to a method for “distributing copyrighted media products over the 
internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted media product at no 
cost in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the 
copyrighted content.”170  Applying step one, the court found the claims at issue 
were directed to the abstract idea that “one can use an advertisement as an 
exchange or currency.”171  The court also found that the claims failed step two 
and were not patent-eligible, because they “simply instruct[ed] the practitioner to 
implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activity.”172 The court 
emphasized that the claims were “not tied to any particular novel machine or 
apparatus, only a general purpose computer.”173 
On the heels of Ultramercial, the court in DDR considered the patent-
eligibility of claims directed to “systems and methods of generating a 
composite web page that combines certain visual elements of a host 
website with content of a third-party merchant.”174  The court punted on 
step one, stating that under any characterization of the abstract idea, the claims at 
issue satisfied step two and were thus patent-eligible.  Specifically, “the claims 
recite an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the 
Internet,”175 instead, “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer 
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of 
computer networks.”176 The DDR court distinguished the claims in 
 
 167.  Gene Quinn, A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS Bank, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-software-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-bank/id=53460/. 
 168.  Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Finds Software Patent Claim Patent Eligible, IPWATCHDOG 
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/05/federal-circuit-finds-software-patent-claim-
patent-eligible/id=52510/. 
 169.  Ultramercial was decided by Judges Lourie, Mayer, and O’Malley. DDR was decided 
by Judges Wallach, Mayer, and Chen.  
 170.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. 
 171.  Id. at 714. 
 172.  Id. at 715. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  DDR, 773 F.3d at 1248. 
 175.  Id. at 1259. 
 176.  Id. at 1257. 
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Ultramercial as merely applying a known business process—use of an 
advertisement as an exchange or currency—to the particular technological 
environment of the Internet.177 
Thus, the metes and bounds of Section 101, particularly as they relate 
to business methods and computer-implemented methods, has always been and 
remains intractably murky.  And yet, these are exactly the types of patentable 
subject matter that have been applied for in huge numbers in the recent past, 
and are favorites of patent trolls to boot. 
More importantly, even if altering the current understanding of patentable 
subject matter under Section 101 could completely alleviate patent trolling, it is 
still unadvisable.  As demonstrated by Alice, even a small shift in the 
interpretation of eligible subject matter under Section 101 stands to 
dramatically affect a huge number of existing patents and patent owners—both 
those patent owners who are trolling, and those who are not by rendering 
thousands of patents invalid after the fact.  That is, after the USPTO had 
examined those patents under a different understanding of what is patentable 
subject matter. 
Practitioners and patent owners alike are united in the hope that either the 
Supreme Court will further refine Alice in order to protect subject matter that 
has always seemed patentable under Section 101, or Congress will step in and 
further refine the actual statute.  Congress’s decision not to amend Section 101 
with the America Invents Act, however, suggests that the Supreme Court may 
be the only realistic option. 
 
2.    Judge Created Early Case Dispositive Procedures 
 
It’s not only the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit that have considered 
changes to patent law to address patent trolling.  Some districts courts have 
implemented rules designed to short-circuit a patent case where a case-
dispositive issue may be identified early in the case.  For example, the Northern  
District of California has implemented a rule that requires parties to identify the 
most significant terms for claim construction.178  Specifically, the rule states 
“[t]he parties shall also jointly identify the 10 terms likely to be most significant 
to resolving the parties’ dispute, including those terms for which construction 
may be case or claim dispositive.”179  Such rules are being developed in 
response to the ever increasing length, complexity, and cost of patent cases.  And 
while these rules are certainly not patent-troll specific, they recognize the value 
of pre-empting cases that lack merit—the types of cases that patent trolls are 
consistently accused of bringing. 
 
 
 177.  Id. at 1259. 
 178.  See Douglas A. Cawley, District Court Patent Case Management Post-AIA, 14 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 77, 84 (2012). 
 179.  N.D. Cal. R. 4-1(b) (emphasis added). 
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Likewise, in response to “nuisance value” or “cost-of-defense” litigation 
tactics in cases involving a large number of defendants, the Eastern District of 
Texas has employed “an early and limited Markman and summary judgment 
hearing to eliminate claims against defendants who do not belong in the 
litigation.”180  In such cases, the court has ordered defendants to “submit three 
potentially case-dispositive claim terms for an early Markman hearing, and set a 
summary judgment hearing regarding those terms.”181  The court has also stayed 
most if not all discovery until after these claim construction rulings.182  In doing 
so, “the Eastern District of Texas has provided defendants a new and potentially 
very effective mechanism to quickly and efficiently dispose of questionable 
patent infringement lawsuits before incurring large discovery cost.”183 
More recently, Federal Circuit Judge Mayer argued (in a concurrence) that 
subject matter challenges under Section 101—which are suddenly relevant again 
post-Alice—should be considered at the outset of a case (even before claim 
construction) in order to conserve scarce judicial resources.184  In particular, 
Judge Mayer opined that “failure to recite statutory subject matter is the sort of 
‘basic deficiency,’ that can, and should, ‘be exposed at the point of minimum 
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court,’” and that resolving 
subject matter eligibility at the outset provides a “bulwark against vexatious 
infringement suits.”185  Judge Mayer further decried that “[t]he scourge of 
meritless infringement claims has continued unabated for decades due, in no 
small measure, to the ease of asserting such claims and the enormous sums 
required to defend against them.”186 
 
3.    New Exceptional Case Standard 
 
Section 285 provides, “The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”187  Beginning with Brooks 
Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the 
Federal Circuit established a two-step inquiry to determine whether to award 
attorneys’ fees under Section 285.188  First, a district court had to “determine 
whether the prevailing party ha[d] proved by clear and convincing evidence 
 
 180.  Fred Berretta & Nick Transier, New Eastern District of Texas Procedures Aim to Curb 
“Nuisance Value” Lawsuits, SIDEBAR (Summer 2011) at 14, available at http://knobbe.com/pdf/2011-
August-New-Eastern-District-of-Texas-Procedures-Aim-to-Curb-Nuisance-Value-Lawsuits.pdf. 
 181.  Id. at 14-15. 
 182.  Id. at 15. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 718 (J. Mayer concurring). 
 185.  Id. at 718-19 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  35 U.S.C.A. § 285 (West 2015). 
 188.  Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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that the case [was] exceptional.”189  Second, if the court found the case to be 
exceptional, it then had to decide whether attorneys’ fees were warranted.190  
The Federal Circuit held that “[a] case may be deemed exceptional” under 
Section 285 only “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” 
or when it is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively 
baseless.”191  Further, the Federal Circuit reviewed the objective prong de 
novo—extending no deference to the trial courts—and the subjective prong for 
clear error.192  Some argued that this framework “so severely limit[ed] district 
court discretion to award fees” that such awards were “essentially non-
existent.”193 
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court turned the exceptional case 
standard on its head: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1749 (2014) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1744 (2014).  Calling the Federal Circuit’s exceptional case framework 
“unduly rigid” and an “encumb[rance] [on] the statutory grant of discretion to 
district courts,” the Supreme Court overruled Brooks Furniture.194  In its place, 
the Court in Octane Fitness held that, “an exceptional case is simply one that 
stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s 
litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was 
litigated.”195  And whether a case is exceptional is a matter of “discretion” for the 
district courts.196  The Court also rejected the requirement that litigants must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a case is exceptional.197  Finally, in 
Highmark, the Court held that “an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 
determination.”198 
Octane Fitness and Highmark appear to have had an immediate impact 
on the prevalence of fee shifting.  As explained in a recent article, the new 
standard under Octane Fitness could provide a much more substantial shield to 
defendants: 
 
While the strength of a plaintiff’s litigation position has been the 
dominant factor in recent decisions awarding fees, the district 
 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id.; see Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (“Even for an exceptional case, the decision to award attorney fees and the amount 
thereof are within the district court’s sound discretion.”). 
 191.  Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at. 1381. 
 192.  Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 193.  Brief for Petitioner at 2, Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 
(2014) (No. 12-1184). 
 194.  Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
 195.  Id. at 1756. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. at 1759. 
 198.  Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
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court’s ability to consider the totality of circumstances in a case 
provides defendants with more flexibility in establishing that a 
case is “exceptional.”199 
 
Practitioners have reported anecdotal evidence of an increase in the number 
of motions filed seeking exceptional case treatment and an increase in the overall 
recovery of attorneys’ fees.200 Consistent with this, statistical analysis of 
exceptional case rulings suggests that success rate of exceptional case motions 
has returned to and even exceeded the rate before Brooks Furniture.201             
 In addition, some have speculated that these two decisions, among other 
factors, have contributed to the recent and sharp decrease in new patent 
litigation.202 
Further, district courts are now considering NPE-specific behavior within 
the “totality of the circumstances” under Octane Fitness in order to award fees 
under Section 285.  For example, in Lumen View Technology LLC v. 
Findthebest.com Inc., the district court specifically characterized the plaintiff as 
“a patent holding ‘Non-Practicing Entity’ that acquires patents and instigates 
patent infringement lawsuits,” and admonished that the plaintiff’s “motivation in 
this litigation was to extract a nuisance settlement,” which “counsels . . . in favor of 
a finding of an exceptional case” under the Octane Fitness test.203  NPEs beware. 
 
4.    Reconsidering the Patent Infringement Pleading Standard 
 
Pleading standards for patent cases have turned into something of a 
duel between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.  Specifically, in a 
recent case, the Federal Circuit held that, although the Supreme Court had 
tightened the pleading requirements in the Iqbal204 and Twombly205 cases, 
those decisions did not formally amend the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which contain model forms for pleading, including Form 18 for 
pleading patent infringement.206  Therefore, for direct infringement at least, 
 
 199.  See “3 Takeaways From Post-Octane Fitness Cases”, LAW 360,  available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/598264/3-takeaways-from-post-octane-fitness-cases (last accessed 
Mar. 26, 2015). 
 200.  Andrew v. Devkar, Examining the Present and Future Impact of Recent Patent Law 
Cases, ASPATORE, Oct. 2014, at 1. 
 201.  See  Randy Lipsitz, Aaron Frankel and Hanna Seifert, Recent Supreme Court Decision Takes Us 
Back to the Future: Attorney Fees Award Rate Increases in Patent Cases, BLOOMBERG LAW, available at 
http://www.bna.com/recent-supreme-court-n17179921906/ (last accessed Mar. 26, 2015) (noting that 
before Brooks Furniture, the success rate of exceptional case motions was around 42 percent, after 
Brooks Furniture it dropped to around 32 percent, and after Octane Fitness, it has risen to at least 
45 percent).  
 202.  Dennis Crouch, A Major Drop in Patent Infringement Litigation?, PATENTLYO (Oct. 9, 
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/patent-infringement-litigation.html. 
 203.  No. 13-cv-3599, 2014 WL 2440867 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014). 
 204.  See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 205.  See generally Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 206.  In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1333-
34 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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the bare requirements of Form 18207 suffice because “Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84 states that ‘the forms in the Appendix suffice under these 
rules . . . .’”208 
 Defendants have criticized the form’s simplicity as inadequate, 
because in many cases they must incur the cost of discovery simply to 
determine exactly what the plaintiff is alleging.209  Additionally, the limited 
nature of Form 18 appears to be in conflict with the heightened pleading 
standard announced by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.210  The 
Federal Circuit, however, held that patent cases are an exception to 
Twombly and Iqbal because Rule 84 “makes clear that a proper use of a 
form contained in the Appendix of Forms effectively immunizes a claimant 
from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.”211 
In response, the Judicial Conference of the United States—established 
to make policy with regard to the administration of federal courts212—has 
released a preliminary draft of their proposed amendments to the FRCP, 
which, among other things, advises abrogating all Rule 84 forms, including 
Form 18.  In particular, the report states, “[s]ome of the forms have come to 
seem inadequate, particularly the Form 18 complaint for patent infringement.”213  
As discussed above, increasing and harmonizing the pleading standards for 






 207.  Id. at 1334 (“Form 18 requires: (1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the 
plaintiff owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing the patent ‘by 
making, selling, and using [the device] embodying the patent’; (4) a statement that the plaintiff 
has given the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and 
damages.”). 
 208.  Id. at 1334. 
 209.  Ryan Davis, Judges’ Plan to Raise Pleading Bar May Curb Trolls, LAW360 (Feb. 14, 
2014, 7:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/509906/judges-plan-to-raise-patent-pleading-
bar-may-curb-trolls. 
 210.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in 
an antitrust case, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact) . . . .”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (extending Twombly to all areas of law; holding 
that to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” that “allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).  
 211.  K-Tech Telecomm. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 212.  Judicial Conference of the United States, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 213.  COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure 276 (2013).  
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IV.    Recommendations 
 
In an address to the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association, Federal 
Circuit Chief Justice Randall Rader admonished that “litigation abuse” has 
contributed most to the “crisis of confidence in patent law” and that “judicial 
correction” is the proper remedy.214  And Judge Rader cautioned against 
legislative actions that would attempt to solve the problem by “definition and 
characteristic”—that is, new laws that would specifically target trolls—because 
litigation abuse is largely a case-by-case factual issue.215  Justice Rader opined 
that: 
 
American law and ethics does not enforce or condition 
enforcement of basic laws and policy on the characteristics of a 
party. American law treats big company and small company, 
foreign entity and domestic entity, different genders, races, and 
ethnicities alike.  Our law does not make distinctions based on the 
characteristics of parties but on their actions proven in a court of 
law.  The definition of a “troll” will always be over-inclusive or 
under-inclusive to the detriment of justice.  Instead of finger-
pointing and name-calling, the law needs to focus on blameworthy 
conduct.216 
 
Justice Rader’s suggested judicial remedies include: (1) increased use 
of summary judgment to “weed out the cases lacking true merit;” (2) more 
discretion to shift fees under Section 285; and (3) expansion of the use of 
model orders to create efficiency and reduce litigation costs—which in turn 
reduces the leverage that spawns litigation abuse.217 
We agree with Justice Rader’s suggestions for the most part.  In particular, 
we agree that attempting to devise laws that single out specific categories or 
definitions of entities (e.g., patent trolls, NPEs, PAEs, PMEs, etc.) are 
ultimately unworkable.  This note led with two specific factual examples of 
parties (recall: a small-inventor and a university), that would be categorized 
as patent trolls under most prevailing definitions.  And most reasonable 
minds would agree that those are just the type of entities that the patent system is 
trying to incentivize to buy into the patent system. 
Furthermore, we believe that proposed solutions that target specific patent 
types, such as business method patents, are worrisome for a variety of reasons.  
First of all, changing the rules with regard to subject matter eligibility may 
 
 214.  Randall R. Rader, Chief Justice, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
Keynote Address at the 2013 Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Conference: Patent Law 
and Litigation Abuse 6 (Nov. 1, 2013) available at http://www.edtexbar.com/2013_conference/. 
 215.  Id. at 7. 
 216.  Id. at 6-7. 
 217.  Id. at 8. 
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seriously undermine the expectations of those who have invested in patents 
regarding particular subject matters under the existing subject matter laws.  And 
there is no guarantee in any event that patent trolls will not just pick up and move 
on to another subject matter area if a particular area is fouled by anti-troll 
provisions.  Ultimately, breeding uncertainty with respect to subject matter 
eligibility will inexorably lead to devaluation of patents generally, which may in-
turn drive inventors away from the system altogether, thereby undermining a 
fundamental purpose of the patent system. 
It is also worth considering that the current Patent Laws have been, more or 
less, around for over 60 years, and only recently needed updating.  This time of 
relative consistency in the statutory framework of patent law suggests at least 
two things: (1) the laws are reasonably effective; and (2) the laws should be 
updated only when they absolutely have to be, and even then, the updates should 
be the result of a calm, analytical approach (not the scatter-shot approach that the 
various stakeholders seem to be utilizing at present). 
Putting it all together, we endorse and recommend provisions that primarily 
improve the quality of patents and deter abusive litigation tactics.  Such 
provisions are in keeping with the purposes of the patent system articulated 
above, i.e., (1) “seek[ing] to foster and reward invention”; (2) “promot[ing] 
disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public 
to practice the invention once the patent expires”; and (3) “assur[ing] that ideas 
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”218  Under these 
guiding principles, we endorse the following ideas as discussed herein: 
(Executive/Legislative) Increase the quality of patents through (1) 
increased training of patent examiners and (2) increased participation of the 
public through crowdsourcing of prior art discovery.  These measures should 
increase the quality of patents going forward without affecting current patent 
owner property rights.  Further, these measures are not specific to a type of 
patent applicant or owner, but rather seek to increase the quality of the system 
as a whole.  Finally, these measures may be effective in an indirect way against 
patent trolls that seek to assert low quality patents against unsophisticated 
clients by preventing those patents from ever issuing. 
(Legislative/Judicial) Revise discovery rules to better balance the cost 
burden of requesting and complying with discovery requests.  Such a provision 
should reduce one of the primary drivers of expense during a patent case, and 
decrease the perceived “nuisance value” of a case, which in-turn may lower the 
expected value of trolling.  Critically, such a provision is agnostic to patent 
ownership, and does not affect any fundamental rights of a patent owner.  
Rather, they are meant to deter litigation misconduct. 
(Legislative) As described above, the judiciary has already taken steps 
to put the bite back into Section 285.  But we still believe that amending 
Section 285 to provide a two-way fee-shifting scheme for patent cases is 
worth further consideration.  An appropriate fee-shifting scheme rebalances 
 
 218.  Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262. 
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the cost/benefit analysis of all parties alike—including trolls—in deciding 
whether or not to pursue a questionable case.  In particular, it may cause a 
law firm willing to take a case on contingency on a wing and a prayer to 
reconsider.  But the two-way nature mitigates the troublesome aspects of 
most fee-shifting provisions and allows latitude for a patent owner to bring 
a case in good faith, even if they ultimately lose.  In other words, the 
scheme recognizes that it is typically not possible to predict the outcome of 
a case without at least some discovery. 
(Judicial/Legislative) Increase the pleading standards for patent cases 
(including direct infringement).  This idea further enforces the idea of 
increasing the due diligence done before a case is filed, which should (in 
theory at least) decrease the number of completely frivolous cases filed.  
Increased pleading standards also plays well with changes to the exceptional 
case standard, since under an increased pleading standard scheme, a frivolous 
plaintiff would have even less justification for a frivolous case.  This idea also 
affects all patent owners alike. 
(Judicial) Adopt local rules that provide early case dispositive check-
valves (e.g., early and limited Markman procedures) designed to flush out 
cases lacking merit.  This idea could significantly reduce the average time and 
cost of dealing with a frivolous lawsuit, whether or not it is brought by a patent 
troll.  It also would serve to save judicial resources for meritorious cases. 
(Legislative) Enact legislation to close the loophole in Section 299 that 
allows courts to consolidate and coordinate multiples cases, based solely on 
allegations they have infringed the same patents in suit, for purposes of pre-trial 
activities.  This idea is meant to finish what was started with the AIA.  While it is 
acknowledged that judges need to have authority to manage their caseload, the 
current consolidation practices may heavily favor plaintiffs in patent lawsuits. 
A common characteristic of our recommended approaches is that they 
have the long-term, and not the nightly news cycle, in mind.  As such, we 
believe that these approaches are likely to engender the most benefits to the 
patent system with the least negative consequences. 
 
IV.    Conclusion 
 
Among others, we started with a question of: what is a “patent troll?”  
Unfortunately, we cannot provide any clear answer because the term tends to 
take on the definition of whatever behavior a particular stakeholder wants to 
prevent.  And no matter how the line is drawn, the definition of “patent troll” 
will appear hopelessly under or over-inclusive depending on perspective. 
As a result, it became clear that rather than refining the definition of the 
term “patent troll,” we needed to instead consider whether the patent law 
framework can be improved regardless of the “existence” of patent trolls.  We 
reached this conclusion because, generally speaking, patent trolls—however 
they should be defined—are just acting to their advantage within an existing  
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legal framework that explicitly allows such activity.  Now, that is not to say 
that there are not patent trolls out there misusing and abusing the system. There 
are.  But, changes to the patent system should be made with a scalpel and not a 
sledgehammer. 
Looking at the issue objectively, the disdain for patent trolls really boils 
down to a lot of subjective criticism and very little reasoned analysis.  But 
before such critics can truly add value to the discussion, they must come to 
terms with the fact that any patent owner asserting a valid patent is well within 
their rights to pursue potential infringers broadly and vigorously.  That is the 
foundational quid pro quo upon which the patent system is built. 
